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Cost-reflective pricing: empirical insights into
irrigators’ preferences for water tariffs
Bethany Cooper, Lin Crase and John M. Rose†
Using prices to improve the efficiency with which water resources are allocated is now
widely accepted in principle if somewhat difficult to achieve in practice. Whilst there
are some technical difficulties associated with full-cost recovery in irrigation, the lack
of political will to tackle reform remains a significant impediment. This article reports
the results of an empirical investigation into farmers’ preferences for changes to water
prices and tariff structures. We conclude that some of the preferences of farmers are
conducive to price reform. We also find evidence that public subsidy of infrastructure
in irrigation is not always aligned with the preferences of farmers.
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1. Introduction
Using pricing to improve the efficiency with which water resources are
allocated is now a widely accepted principle in many countries (Iglesias and
Blanco 2008; Rigby et al. 2010). In addition, mounting concern about the
environmental ills that attend excessive water abstraction coupled with
greater scrutiny of public expenditures in general has added momentum to
the policy interest in market-based approaches and the notion of full-cost
recovery from water users (see Zuo et al. 2015).
Useful theoretical debates about the appropriate structure of water tariffs
to achieve both cost recovery and efficiency are available within the literature
(e.g. Loehman 2008; Griffin 2009), but the practical dimensions to achieving
cost recovery in some sectors remain a challenge. Even in the developed
countries that make up the OECD, many irrigators ‘benefit from policies that
allow them to forego repaying capital expenditures for irrigation infrastruc-
ture or to schedule repayment over many years with zero interest’ (OECD
2010, p. 139). In the United States, prices vary according to the nature of the
water project and the attending institutions, such that cost recovery cannot be
assured (Wichelns 2010), and in Australia, where the national reform agenda
has placed a high priority on water pricing for almost 30 years, full-cost
recovery fails to be achieved in some irrigation areas (Crase et al. 2015).
† Bethany Cooper, and Lin Crase (email: lin.crase@unisa.edu.au) are with the Business
School, University of South Australia, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia. John M. Rose is
with the Business School, University of South Australia, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia.
He is also at the Business Intelligence and Data Analytics UTS School of Business, University
of Technology Sydney, Australia.
© 2017 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
doi: 10.1111/1467-8489.12242
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 62, pp. 256–278
The Australian Journal of
Journal of the Australian
Agricultural and Resource
Economics Society
The political economy of water pricing in irrigation remains problematic
and Cornish et al. (2004) observe that there is often a lack of political will to
impose additional costs on farmers, regardless of their income or wealth
relative to others in the community. Easter and Liu (2005) offer an eightfold
typology to explain why cost recovery rates are low in irrigation, including
the absence of links between fees and services and limited irrigator
participation in decision-making, but little is known of the relative
importance of these constraints.
The debate about cost recovery and water pricing is also circumscribed by
confusion about which prices are relevant to particular decision-makers. To
achieve cost recovery, the providers of irrigation services need to generate
revenue from end users. This requirement for revenue is sometimes conflated
with the prices paid for securing irrigation entitlements and allocations, where
water rights are traded (see, Easter and Liu 2005). However, in the context of
cost recovery for communal irrigation projects, the key issue is the willingness
of irrigators to pay ongoing fees, not their reservations price for water rights.
The revenue required by service providers can be collected using different
tariffs, and irrigation farmers may have different preferences around these,
which ultimately influences their enthusiasm for paying fees.
This article presents the results of an empirical study that focused on
irrigators’ preferences for changing the way tariffs are structured in a
communal irrigation area. The setting for the study is the northern irrigation
regions of Victoria. Australia has often been regarded as being at the
forefront of market-based water reforms (see, The Economist 2003; National
Water Commission 2012), although the controversies associated with full-
cost recovery from irrigators are no less pressing in Australia than elsewhere.
Irrigators continue to have infrastructure gifted by government, ultimately
distorting incentives for water use (Pawsey and Crase 2013) and understand-
ing the perspective of irrigation farmers and the elements of tariffs that are
less likely to attract opposition offers some promise in this politically volatile
environment.
The remainder of the article is organised into seven additional parts. In
Section 2, we provide a brief review of water tariffs whilst a synopsis of the
policy and pricing arrangements that circumscribe the study area are
presented in Section 3. Section 4 is used to outline the policy context and
the best-worst scaling methodology is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and
7 present the results and discuss the policy implications. Brief concluding
remarks are presented in the final section.
2. Water tariffs
Water tariffs often reflect historical precedents and are not always simple to
adjust. Griffin (2001, p. 1,335) notes that ‘judging from current inertia, both
rate-setting policies and governing rules have been dominated by accounting
conventions rather than economic ones’. The focus on water tariff design has
© 2017 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc.
Insights into water price reform 257
also generally centred on urban water users (see, for instance, Sibly and
Tooth 2014) rather than agricultural users and lessons are only transferrable
to the extent that measurement technologies are similar. From a global
perspective, water charges in irrigation are often based on a multiple of the
area of land irrigated, or the area that is irrigable. A variation on this
approach involves using crop types to determine water charges – this at least
takes some account of water usage (Easter and Liu 2005). By world standards
volumetric (i.e. metered) water pricing is relatively rare in irrigation, but
widely deployed in developed countries, like Australia.
Where water use is measured volumetrically, questions arise about the
tariff design that will adequately recover costs without generating rents for
service providers, who are usually natural monopolies. In irrigation in
Australia, these entities are referred to as Irrigation Infrastructure Operators
(IIOs) and generally IIOs might be expected to face decreasing average cost.
Thus, setting prices equal to marginal cost would generate losses and the
challenge becomes establishing a pricing regime that approximates the social
optimum of marginal cost pricing whilst maintaining the long-term viability
of the IIO. To deal with this problem, general theories on public utility
pricing have long advocated the use of two-part tariffs (e.g. Lewis 1941)
where a fixed charge is applied to cover any shortfall in revenue arising from a
usage charge set at marginal cost. This general approach is embodied in the
National Water Initiative (NWI) which has been the blueprint of reform in
Australia for more than 30 years.
Whilst the principles that underpin the two-part tariff are well understood,
in practice their application is confounded on several fronts. First, the two-
part tariff will only be efficient to the extent that the service provider is
obliged to operate at minimum cost. It is for this reason that economic
regulation becomes important. Second, it is not always the case that the
opportunity costs of all resources will be integrated into the final tariff. If
externalities are not priced then the fixed and volumetric components may
still fail to signal efficient use. In addition, if water access is ‘gifted’, there is no
accounting basis for including the value of access entitlements in the costs of
service providers. This is less problematic where water rights are relatively
scarce and traded, as is the case in parts of Australia, but the notion of gifting
resources can nonetheless distort prices – a point we take up later.
Griffin (2001) makes progress on some of these issues from a theoretical
perspective by considering the effective pricing strategy for a nonprofit
municipal water supplier. He further argues that this approach is sufficiently
broad and ‘the full analysis is equally applicable to irrigation districts
supplying metered water’ (p. 1,336). In general, he finds that a standard two-
part tariff can be efficient when accompanied by a number of adjustments. In
particular, where unrenewable groundwater is involved, Griffin (2001) argues
for the inclusion of a marginal user cost that relates to ‘the future opportunity
costs of present water consumption’ (p. 1,345). Importantly, Griffin (2001)
finds that the marginal capacity cost also needs to be considered to achieve
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efficiency and this can be included in the form of a fee levied on new
customers connecting to the supply network. Set at the marginal cost of
network expansion, this charge recognises the scarcity of nonwater resources,
like those related to infrastructure. Although not specifically addressed,
presumably any radical improvement in infrastructure should attract charges
on a similar basis, even for existing customers.
In the case of most water supply businesses, the cost of provision is
dominated by the fixed costs associated with supply infrastructure, implying
that an efficient tariff would comprise a relatively large access charge and a
small volumetric charge. However, of the few instances where customer
preferences have been explored, higher volumetric charges have been sought,
primarily reflecting the desire of customers to be ‘rewarded’ for conservation
behaviours (Crase et al. 2008). In the context of irrigation, very little
published information is on hand about users’ preferences for different tariffs.
Overwhelmingly, studies that have explored irrigators’ preferences have
focussed on overall willingness to pay higher charges in response to improved
services (see, e.g. Alhassan et al. 2013), rather than considering preferences
for elements of tariff design.
3. Water tariffs in northern Victoria
The theoretical tidiness of water pricing is seldom matched in real life, as
evidenced by the arrangements in northern Victoria. The state-owned water
supply business in northern Victoria is Goulburn–Murray Water (G-MW),
which is sometimes referred to as the Goulburn–Murray Irrigation District
(G-MID). At the time this study was undertaken, there were up to 400
different charges that could potentially be levied by G-MW, often on the basis
of historical decisions that have little resemblance to current resource
availability or service. Some understanding of the architecture of tariffs in the
study region is important for interpreting the results.
Irrigators generally face a set of fixed charges that relate to water and
infrastructure access and variable charges that relate to water use. Each
irrigator in G-MW holds a water entitlement described in volumetric terms
and use cannot exceed the volumetric limit on that entitlement without
attracting a penalty. The penalty is in the form of a so-called Casual Use Fee
(described in Table 1, below). Water trade is restricted to locations with
hydrological connectivity so that G-MW is able to deliver any purchased
water.
The fixed charges faced by irrigators are primarily driven by the notion of a
deliver ‘share’. This is essentially an infrastructure access fee and relates to the
right to access the communal irrigation channel. This fee is charged on a
megalitre per day basis, irrespective of the volume of water actually owned or
used on a farm. In simple terms, the delivery share represents 1 ML of
assured water access from the irrigation network in a day. Irrigators can
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purchase additional delivery shares to increase access and to gain priority
during times of congestion, but this is capped at 270 delivery shares per farm.
The delivery share charges differ within the six irrigation districts that make
up G-MW, reflecting historic decisions regarding the levels of investment and
density of servicing infrastructure in each district. The charge also plays an
important role in influencing decisions to exit irrigation. Under the current
arrangements, irrigators can sell their entitlement (i.e. their perpetual access
right to water), but to exit irrigation permanently, they must also pay a
multiple of the delivery share charge to G-MW. This process is rationalised
on the basis that remaining irrigators would be required to meet higher
ongoing costs – sometimes called the ‘stranded asset’ problem. The multiple is
set at ten and since delivery share charges range between $2,700 and $4,700
per year, the termination charge substantially weakens incentives to exit
irrigation entirely. For example, an irrigator who held 1,000 megalitres and
who sold all entitlements to another entity would still be required to pay as
much as $4 million to completely exit irrigation.
Other fixed charges relate to the number of service points available, and
this cost does not always reflect any ‘new’ technology used in the
infrastructure. Variable charges are driven by water use, but this generally
accounts for only 10 per cent of the total cost.
4. The political context for change and the policy conundrum
As noted earlier, an enduring blueprint for water reform exists in Australia in
the form of the NWI. The basic tenet of these reforms was that market-based
approaches, including cost recovery pricing, would result in a more efficient
and sustainable allocation of resources. A substantial weakening of the
commitment to full-cost recovery pricing in irrigation occurred in 2007.
Faced with one of the longest droughts on record and mounting evidence of
the environmental degradation in the Murray–Darling Basin, the Federal
government announced a plan to permanently rectify the over-allocation of
water in the Basin. This plan included the Commonwealth government
wresting control of water from the state governments and the provision of
publicly funded ‘water-saving’ infrastructure to irrigators in return for water
for the environment. Although the plan was modified with the election of a
new Federal government, the basic idea of subsidising irrigation infrastruc-
ture remains part of the policy settings. Government buyback of water
entitlements was subsequently put on hold (see, Joyce 2016), and the
expenditure on irrigation infrastructure continues to significantly outweigh
monies set aside for purchasing water rights.
Under the Water Act 2007, IIOs were to be subject to economic regulation
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The
earlier reforms in Victoria meant that G-MW was already subject to
regulation by the Essential Services Commission of Victoria (ESC) such that,
in effect, the ESC continues to regulate G-MW with reference to the rules
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developed and by ACCC. In 2016, the ACCC undertook a review of water
charging rules that apply to IIOs. The review focussed on three categories of
rules pertaining to pricing infrastructure; termination charges; and planning
and information management. Overall, the ACCC found that there were
opportunities to streamline some pricing rules and make them more
consistent and transparent to customers. In addition, the review concluded
the maximum permissible termination charge would remain at ten times the
fixed delivery charge, although IIOs could apply a lower fee if they wish
(ACCC 2016).
The arrangements for economic regulation of irrigation in Victoria have
been complicated by the Federal government’s attempt to reassign water for
environmental purposes and the related ambitions of the state government to
shore up urban supplies in Melbourne. The upshot has been that G-MW
received almost $2 billion of public monies for irrigation infrastructure in the
last 9 years. There is also an inherent conundrum for regulators, IIOs and
irrigators created by these arrangements. On the one hand, the earlier
purchase of water entitlements by environmental agencies potentially reduces
the number of irrigators calling on the irrigation network. On the other hand,
subsequent spending on irrigation infrastructure has raised the value of that
network but with potentially fewer irrigators to fund cost recovery.
An important but underinvestigated component of public provision of
irrigation infrastructure is that the value of gifted infrastructure does not add
to the regulator asset base (RAB) upon which regulated water prices are
calculated. In simple terms, there is no requirement to meet the cost of capital
associated with these investments, nor is there a requirement to pay prices
that recover the costs of depreciation on the gifted components.
At the time of this study, the management of G-MWalso recognised that the
sustainability of irrigation in the region was threatened by poor cost recovery.
There is considerable heterogeneity amongst farmers in the G-MW and
potentially differing appetites for change. One element of this heterogeneity
relates to the proximity of farms to the main irrigation channels – commonly
referred to as the backbone. As part of the deployment of improved irrigation
infrastructure, G-MW had focussed most efforts on enhancing services closer
to the backbone with smaller channels being decommissioned or control
assumed by individual irrigators (G-MW 2010). It was against that
background that a methodology was required that could guide tariff reform.
5. Best-worst Scaling and water prices
An analytical technique known as best-worst Scaling (BWS) was judged to be
useful in this context. BWS is a survey approach centred on an ordering task
that requires participants to make a selection from a collection of items by
choosing the ‘best’ (most preferred) and ‘worst’ (least preferred) items in a
series of blocks that contain three or more items. The items may be attributes
of a product, options in a decision, or bundles of services and products. The
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method allows for numerical ordering of a set of objects or items to identify
their ‘degree of importance’ or ‘extent of preference’. By designing a
best-worst experiment where the attributes were components of a water tariff,
we hoped to identity which parts of the tariff were more (less) highly valued.
BWS was developed by Louviere and Woodworth (1990). Essentially, BWS
is a preference elicitation approach that only requires an assumption of
ordinality. BWS is underpinned by the same random utility framework that
underlies discrete choice experiments (DCEs), and the technique is less
cognitively demanding on respondents than other DCEs (Flynn 2010).
Flynn et al. (2007, p. 172) highlight the two principle limitation of
traditional DCEs that are overcome using BWS. First, the ‘pick-one’ process
that typifies DCEs is a relatively inefficient approach to obtaining preference
information. Second, the regression constant term in DCEs results in the
attribute impacts being confounded with level scale values.
The BWS approach to determine preferences is particularly effective in
creating a numerical ordering in cases with a large number of product
attributes or options. Marley and Louviere (2005) highlight the formal
statistical and measurement properties for BWS. One of the important
characteristics of BWS is that it measures all of the attributes on a common
scale (Auger et al. 2007). Moreover, the method addresses the scalar
inequivalence problem that characterises the way respondents use rating
scales (Cohen and Neira 2003).
Three main types of BWS have been identified in the literature and referred
to as: (i) case 1, the object case; (ii) case 2, the profile case; and (iii) case 3, the
multiprofile case (see, i.e. Flynn 2010; Louviere et al. 2015). BWS case 1
permits the researcher to obtain measures for each respondent on a different
scale with known properties (Marley and Louviere 2005). BWS case 2 (Flynn
et al. 2007; Marley et al. 2008) and case 3 (Flynn 2010) build on case 1 and
allow for items to be represented as multidimensional choice objects
(Louviere et al. 2013).
A process involving in-depth interviews with irrigators and irrigation
officials, focus groups and piloting was used in this study and is described in
detail in Cooper and Crase (2013). In total, eight attributes were identified to
be included in the best-worst experiment, and these are summarised in
Table 1. The criteria used to include these attributes were salience to
irrigators and irrigation officials and the extent to which they might be used
to progress tariff reform.
Note that in case 2 BWS, each alternative is a single attribute, described by
different levels. In choosing an alternative, the respondent is really choosing
an attribute. In the current experiment, the design approximates case 2;
however, there are four alternatives with eight attributes. The design
ostensibly chooses four of the eight attributes (from Table 1), and then, a
second design allocates the levels of the selected attribute – this is effectively a
hybrid residing between Case 1 and Case 2.
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A balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) was used to determine which
of the eight attributes should be shown to respondents (see, e.g., Street and
Street 1987; Louviere et al. 2015). Table 1 shows that some attributes had
three levels whilst others were represented by only two. These levels were
selected in consultation with management of G-MW who identified the range
over which some attributes could be changed, given their knowledge of the
regulatory regime in Victoria.
A total of 56 choice tasks were generated using the BIBD and this comprised
thirteen blocks. Put differently, the design resulted in thirteen versions of the
survey and each respondent was faced with only four choice tasks. Each choice
task comprised four components – each component being a single level and
attribute of the bill and the respondent nominating the best and worst of those
four components.1 An example of a best-worst question appears as Figure 1.
Options Which option do you 
LEAST prefer?
(Select ONLY ONE) Sets of options for you to consider
Which option do you 
MOST prefer?
(Select ONLY ONE)
1
Reduce volume of Delivery Share 
from 270 mL per Delivery Share 
to 150 mL per Delivery Share
2
Move to 100% fixed charges 
(currently 90% fixed costs:10% 
variable costs)
3 Keep Casual Use Fees as they are. Typically, the fee is $80/mL. 
4
Move to a Single charge for
Delivery Share (mL/day) across 
all irrigation districts. 
In the example above, the selection means a person is saying that out of the four options listed:
• the option they LEAST prefer is ‘Reduce volume of Delivery Share from 270 mL per 
Delivery Share to 150 mL per Delivery Share’
• the option they MOST prefer is ‘Keep Casual Use Fees as they are’
Note: Only one box is ticked in each of these 
columns
Figure 1 Example answer of best-worst question.
1 The experimental design comprised 56 possible choice sets in total. To limit the cognitive
burden placed on respondents, the design was split into 14 different survey blocks where each
survey respondent only faced 4 choice sets. Note that each choice set contained 4 items
requiring a choice on both the ‘Best’ and ‘Worst’ option.
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The survey comprised four parts. The first part included questions to
capture the socio-demographics of the respondents, their water trading
history and intentions, and their attitudes towards the irrigation infrastruc-
ture modernisation scheme (i.e. the name given to the publicly subsidised
irrigation infrastructure at that time). The second part presented respondents
with a range of questions to identify their level of understanding of the
pricing process and the current tariff structure. The BWS questions were
presented in the third section whilst the final part comprised questions about
respondents’ attitudes towards the environment, climate change and risk.
As already noted, the attributes and levels emanated partly from discussions
with senior managers at G-MW. These were effectively real-world scenarios
that managers had been informally exploring with irrigators across the region.
The full survey was piloted with three Water Service Committees – these are
groups of irrigators that act as sounding boards for the managers of the
irrigation district and who are also responsible for disseminating information
to others. This piloting phase also allowed for open discussion of tariff reform
and ultimately some refinement to terminology in the survey was required, but
the attributes and levels remained unaltered.
Feedback from focus sessions suggested that an online survey would be
inaccessible, given the access to technology, and phone surveys invariably
interrupted farming tasks. A mail-out survey was deemed to be most
appropriate, and this was administered following Dillman’s total design
method, with prepaid envelopes, introductory letters and the establishment of
a toll-free help line. In the light of concerns about the privacy of customer
information, the mail survey was administered from the offices of G-MW
with 2000 surveys circulated.2
6. Findings from the best-worst experiment
The data reported here were collected from across the G-MID between
November 2012 and January 2013. The main survey was accompanied by
press releases to stimulate additional responses, and direct encouragement
was also offered by members of the Water Service Committees. The response
rate to the survey was approximately 14 per cent. Of the 274 survey responses
received, 27 per cent were partially incomplete and results need to be
considered in this context. Most respondents were male (82 per cent), and the
median age of respondents was between 55 and 64. A little over one-fifth (22
per cent) had completed a tertiary degree or higher, and the median income
before tax was in excess of $100,000 although the median after tax profit was
$50,000. Respondents covered all of the irrigation areas across G-MID
although most responses (38 per cent) were sourced from the Central
Goulburn region. The final data set consisted of 199 respondents generating
6,368 choices on which to formulate empirical models.
2 A copy of the survey is available from the authors, on request.
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The spread of the sample by irrigation districts within G-MW is shown in
Table 2 and a chi-square test showed significant differences between the
sample and the population – notably, landholders in the Shepparton region
were underrepresented. A key influence in this case was likely to be the
proximity of the farm to the irrigation ‘backbone’. Around 57 per cent of the
sample farms were connected to the irrigation backbone which compares with
44 per cent of irrigation farms in the region (G-MW 2013).
6.1 Coding of variables
The potential of nonlinearity in the marginal utilities between levels implies
the need for either dummy coding or effects coding. Dummy coding employs
a series of 0s and 1s to relate each attribute level of the original variable to the
newly created columns, and this was employed here. Table 3 illustrates the
dummy coding process for the Delivery Share attribute.
The dummy coding used here differs somewhat from that applied
elsewhere. This is because of the way the survey questions were presented
to respondents. Typically, dummy variables require one level of each
attribute to be coded as all zeros, and this level represents ‘the base level’
for that attribute or variable. The level that is coded 1 is then interpreted as
being relative to the base of that attribute. Here, only one base level is
constructed for all attributes. As such, the model results are interpreted as
being relative to the base level of this single attribute, rather than each
attribute having its own reference or base level. More specifically, dummy
variables were established for k  1 attributes, and as there were eight
attributes in the best-worst experiment, seven dummy variables were created.
Table 2 Sample portion per irrigation district
District Sample (%) Proportion of landholder
Population in the G-MID (%)*
Central Goulburn 38 26
Loddon Valley 5 18
Murray Valley 14 11
Rochester–Campaspe 13 20
Shepparton 10 1
Torrumbarry 20 24
*Source: G-MW (2013).
Table 3 Example dummy coding
Delivery share attribute levels Original code Dummy code
Level 1 Level 2
Level 1 0 1 0
Level 2 1 0 1
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This is because each choice task was designed with four of the eight
attributes; thus, the dummy variables reflect the presence or absence of an
attribute in the choice. In this instance, there was no dummy variable created
for the break down of charges attribute to create a base attribute. This is
simply a parsimonious choice and has no bearing on the results per se.
The utility structure used in the current study is shown in Equations (a–d):
Uðbw1Þ ¼ bxDbw1 þ bxbw1 ; ðaÞ
Uðbw2Þ ¼ bxDbw2 þ bxbw2 ; ðbÞ
Uðbw3Þ ¼ bxDbw3 þ bxbw3 ; ðcÞ
Uðbw4Þ ¼ bxDbw4 þ bxbw4 ; ðdÞ
where bxDbwj are the parameters associated with the dummy variables, and
bxbwj are the parameters associated with the attribute levels.
6.2 Best-worst Scaling: Latent class model
In this article, we report the results of a latent class (LC) logit model which
allows us to directly compare respondents’ preferences for the variables
included in the BWS experiment (see, i.e., Auger et al. 2007). The LC model
assumes the existence of C classes or segments within the population of N
sampled respondents where C is exogenously defined a priori by the analyst.
Allocation of respondents to classes is not observed directly by the analyst
and hence is latent, being modelled probabilistically via a class assignment
model. As such, each sampled respondent is assigned to each class up to a
probability as opposed to being assigned to any one specific class. Within the
LC model, each class will have a unique utility function.
The class assignment model is typically specified using a multinomial logit
(MNL) model form, where the attributes of the model consist of socio-
demographic characteristics or contextual covariates. Given the MNL model
specification, the probability that respondent n belongs to class c given
covariates Zn is given as follows:
Pnc ¼ expðh
0
cZnÞPC
b¼1 expðh0bZnÞ
: ð1Þ
Given class membership to segment C, the probability that respondent n
would choose a particular tariff structure is derived under the random utility
theoretical (RUT) framework. Under the RUT framework, an individual
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respondent is assumed to select the alternative for which they hold the highest
utility. Assuming the error terms of the model are independently and
identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1, the probability that
individual n chooses alternative j in choice task t, conditional to belonging to
class c is given in Equation (2):
Pnjtjc ¼ expðb
0
cxnjtÞPJ
i¼1 expðb0cxnitÞ
; ð2Þ
where xnjt represents a vector of attributes associated with alternative j in
choice task t and b0c a vector of estimated coefficients. Given the pseudo panel
nature of the data, where each respondent is observed to answer more than
one choice task, rather than model the probability that n chooses alternative j
in choice task t, we model the probability of observing respondent n make the
observed sequence of choices of all T choice tasks presented to them. As such,
the conditional choice probability of the model is given as:
Pnjc ¼
YT
t¼1
ðPnjtjcÞynjt ; ð3Þ
where ynjt represents a 0–1 choice index equal to 1 if alternative j was
observed to be chosen or 0 otherwise.
Given the above, the unconditional choice probability associated with
observing respondent n make a sequence of choices over T choice tasks is
calculated as:
Pn ¼
XC
c¼1
PncP

njc: ð4Þ
Given data, the aim is to estimate the parameters h0c and b
0
c. This is
achieved using maximum likelihood estimation methods. In the case of the
LC model as specified above, the log-likelihood function used to find the
parameters is given in Equation (5):
LL ¼
XN
n¼1
lnðPnÞ: ð5Þ
Essentially, the model captures the effect of the attribute and the effect of
the attribute levels on different classes of respondents’ preferences, whilst also
accounting for the pseudo panel nature of the data.
Latent classes with 2, 3, 4 and 5 classes were estimated on the data.
Constants only were assumed for the class assignment models in each case.
The identification of the number of classes in the population was achieved by
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selecting models with alternative numbers of classes on the basis of the CAIC
criteria (see Louviere et al. 2000), whilst simultaneously ensuring that each
class makes behavioural sense. Table 4 reports the AIC, BIC and CAIC
criterion for the different LC models estimated. The final model reported has
four preference classes (n.b. whilst providing a better model fit, the
parameters in one of the classes exploded when five classes were assumed
suggesting a convergence issue).
The final model results are shown in Table 5. The results demonstrate that
significant preference heterogeneity exists within the sampled population,
whilst it is also noteworthy that every attribute is statistically significant in at
least one class.
Given that each variable in the model has been dummy coded (relative to
break down of charges), the variables are thus measured using the same
metric and hence can be directly compared. It is important to note that the
coding of the data as described above results in 16 variables for each class
within the model. Each variable corresponds with the attribute and related
level, less the status quo for the break down of charges attribute. Care is
required, however, in interpreting the results, as the utility obtained from
discrete choice models is ordinal, and hence, the marginal utilities represented
by the parameter estimates are relative and not absolute. To estimate the
model, the parameter for the first level of the break down of charges variable
was normalised to zero and hence represents the base level against which all
other variables are measured (although it is possible to compare the relative
differences between any of the parameters).
For the first class, which has the largest population mass (38.6 per cent of
the sample), all the statistically significant parameters are negative, suggesting
that the presence of these variables provides disutility relative to the base
attribute level of keeping the original break down of charges. For members of
this class, reducing the volume of delivery share from 270 to 150 ML provides
the greatest disutility of all attribute levels, followed by leaving the service
point charge at a low fee of $250/service point per year whilst maintaining a
high infrastructure access fee and moving to a single charge for delivery share
(ML/day) across all irrigation districts.
For members belonging to class two, comprising nearly 20 per cent of the
sample, relative to the base attribute level, there exists a preference to reduce
the termination fee from 10 times to 8 times the cost of each delivery share.
Further, respondents belonging to this class would prefer a simplified bill
Table 4 Latent class model fit statistics
2 Classes 3 Classes 4 Classes 5 Classes
AIC 3778.190 3695.879 3610.842 3604.375
BIC 1612.795 1429.302 1244.447 1098.877
CAIC 3440.214 3206.046 2987.284 2865.224
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relative to the current bill, whilst increasing the service point charge whilst
simultaneously lowering the infrastructure access fee is preferred over keeping
the current number of charges. The least preferred variable for this segment is
to retain the current service fee.
For class three, comprising nearly 28 per cent of the sampled population,
the most preferred action would be to reduce the termination fee, followed by
simplifying the number of charges, whilst the least preferred item would
involve increasing the service point charge whilst simultaneously lowering the
infrastructure access fee. Similar to class three, respondents belonging to class
four have a preference for simplifying the number of charges; however, in
contrast to class two, their most preferred action would be to keep the service
point charge as is but retain a higher infrastructure access fee.
As noted, one of the major advantages of this approach is that variables are
measured on the same metric and we can thus interpret them directly. In this
model, the parameters are relative to Level 1 of the break down of charges
attribute and we can normalise the parameters between 0 and 1 to develop an
index to compare the preferred outcomes (i.e. list most to least preferred
pricing structure).3 Table 6 reports the parameters that have been normalised
from 0 to 1 for each class. Parameters that are not statistically significant are
constrained to 0. The final two columns in the Table report the normalised
parameter results by weighing the class-specific normalised parameters by the
class assignment probabilities.
As highlighted earlier, the base attribute in this instance is “break down of
charges”. Accordingly, the normalised parameters are relative to Level 1 for
this attribute. This attribute and level were defined as ‘keep the existing break
down of charges that appear on your bill’. Within each class, the attribute
levels that have normalised parameters equal to zero are all equally preferred
to Level 1 of the specified break down of charges attribute. For class one, these
variables include Pricing StrategyD, Delivery ShareD, Termination Fee 2 and
Payment Instalment Options D. All other parameters are negative for this
class and hence are less preferred than these attribute levels. The results for the
three other classes can be similarly interpreted with positive parameters
indicating greater preference relative to Level 1 of break down of charges. The
class probability weighted results presented in the final two columns represent
the population average estimates for the normalised parameter estimates.
Overall, for the population, the most preferred attribute level is Payment
Instalment Options D, whilst Service Point Fee 2 is the least preferred.
It is also useful to scale the parameters to take values between 0 and 1. Such
a rescaling of the results is also presented in the final column of Table 6. The
rescaling and graphing of the data provides a relative index of attribute level
importance by class, as well as for the population on average. The results of
this exercise should be consistent with the results presented for the normalised
parameter estimates.
3 Changing the base will simply rescale the results, but preserve the relative differences.
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7. Interpretation and implications for tariff reform
Whilst acknowledging some limits with these data, there are several insights
that arise about tariff reform in this context. The least preferred pricing
structures identified by respondents commencing with most egregious were as
follows: increasing the service point charge from $250 to $1000/service point
per year and lowering the infrastructure access fee (i.e. reducing the cost of
each delivery share by $600); reducing the volume of delivery share from 270
to 150 ML; maintaining the termination fee at 10 times the cost of each
delivery share; adjusting charges such that they are 100 per cent fixed
(currently 90 per cent fixed and 10 per cent variable); adopting a single
delivery share charge (based on ML/day) across all irrigation districts;
retaining casual use fees as they are – typically the fee is $80 per ML.
The most preferred tariff components include the following: maintaining
the current payment instalment options; a reduction in the termination fee
from 10 to 8 times the cost of each delivery share; reducing the number of
charges to simplify the bill; keeping the charges for delivery share differen-
tiated across the irrigation districts; and retaining the current volume of
270 ML per delivery share.
Recall that our interest was to establish the preferences of irrigators for
tariff reform, and in that context, it is worth noting that this information
provides some insights for practitioners seeking to progress the debate about
cost recovery. Our prior hypothesis was that irrigators are more inclined to
engage positively in discussions about cost recovery if the structure of the
water tariff better aligns with their preferences. In addition, some elements of
the tariff are more likely to reflect changes in underlying and future costs than
others. Understanding the most preferred irrigator options offers scope for
engaging in a dialogue about full-cost recovery pricing, and in that context,
we focus primarily on the three most preferred options.
First, there was support from the modelled data for the option to stay with
the existing payment instalment plan. This emphasises the importance of
understanding the synergies between revenue management on the part of the
government-owned water supply corporation and cash flow of farm
businesses that access water. Regardless, this approach is not inconsistent
with the notion of full-cost recovery.
Second, irrigators expressed a preference for a reduction in the termination
fees. These findings have implications beyond the IIO involved in this project
and may have ramifications for governments involved in gifting assets to
irrigation entities. One of the major justifications for the current policy
approach (i.e. public subsidy of irrigation infrastructure) has been that
additional irrigation infrastructure represents an opportunity to increase the
financial viability of irrigation (Crase et al. 2013). Moreover, both state and
federal governments have expressed a preference to gift assets and impose
limits on the repurchase of water rights by government (see, Joyce 2016). The
support of irrigators for refurbishment of infrastructure has often been
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presumed in the public advocacy of this approach, and some lobbyists have
also contended that this is the only fair mechanism for reducing abstractions
by irrigators (Crase et al. 2011). Whilst acknowledging some limits from this
survey, the data raise important questions about the potential reluctance on
the part of some irrigators to be locked into infrastructure choices. Similar
support was evidenced in submissions to the ACCC review, with the
Victorian Farmers’ Federation noting that termination fees have acted as a
barrier to network rationalisation by deterring exit. Had greater exit occurred
the progress of the overall infrastructure project may have been improved
(ACCC 2016, p. 261).
This raises questions about the efficacy of a policy approach that claims to
be supporting irrigation communities in the long run when there is at least
some evidence that a cohort of irrigators have very different preferences. In
simple terms, irrigators’ preferences for lower termination charges are not
consistent with governments’ commitment to gift additional irrigation
infrastructure in the hope of holding people in irrigation. Arguably, this
process is also not consistent with the desire to have resource scarcity
captured over time.
These data thus shed some light on the potential for policymakers to send
mixed messages to irrigators about the need to adjust their demand for water.
This is particularly evident when buyback of water rights is undertaken
simultaneously with publicly funded infrastructure upgrades in irrigation. On
the one hand, governments have sought to use the market to purchase water
rights from willing sellers to restore environmental flows in the Murray–
Darling Basin. This has had the effect of increasing the price (value) of water
rights and encouraged irrigators to move away from some relatively low-
value water-intensive activities. On the other hand, governments have
simultaneously subsidised irrigation infrastructure for some water users,
thereby depressing the charges paid by irrigators to IIOs, like G-MW. In
effect those fortunate to be part of the upgrade plans experience an increase in
wealth through rising entitlement prices and simultaneously accessing the
related infrastructure at lower-than-cost prices.
The response of water supply businesses to possible widespread participa-
tion in water buybacks has been to increase the termination fees faced by
irrigators, thus creating a perception amongst some irrigators of being
penalised for opting to leave the industry. Admittedly, there are other reasons
that may explain why irrigators continue to pay their ongoing delivery share
costs, like concerns about the value of land for future sale or keeping options
open to reactivate irrigation (see, e.g. Wheeler et al. 2014). Nonetheless,
setting a termination fee at ten times the delivery share is a nontrivial
disincentive to reduce the irrigation footprint and material reductions in
termination charges could help ensure that mixed messages do not unduly
slow irrigation farmer adaptation.
Third, the data suggest that a simplification of the tariff, so that it
communicates adequate information about water use, service and the
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underlying relationship to cost and water availability, would be well regarded
by irrigators.Whilst this approach is also supported on theoretical grounds, the
empirical data collected as part of this project arguably offers a more
compelling argument for change. In contrast, some economic regulators have
been keen to advocate that tariffs explicitly detail the basis of every charge and
every adjustment to a charge. However, this detail comes at a cost to those who
must interpret complex water bills and clearly there are cognitive limits for
those receiving this information. As noted earlier, there are potentially around
400 different charges that could be levied on irrigators in G-MW. The data
collected by this project suggests adjustments in favour of a simplified and clear
price are long overdue. The more recent findings of ACCC (2016) offer
additional support on this front by suggesting streamlining of regulatory
processes but the extent to which this is reflected in simpler tariffs is unclear.
Collectively, these data support the view that there is a basis for pursuing
tariff reform and this may help deal with the underlying concerns about cost
recovery in irrigation. Irrigators sampled in this study had a preference for
changing some of the ways they pay for irrigation water and the related
services; these preferences are not inconsistent with the market frameworks
that align with full-cost recovery. This is not to say that irrigators will
acquiesce to change; rather, the data suggest that there is a basis for staging
price reform in the study area and that the political costs of changing tariffs
may not be so large as to forestall all market-based pricing reforms. As a
minimum, this study points to the basis on which a discussion about cost
recovery can take place between irrigators, IIOs and regulators.
8. Concluding remarks
Reforming market signals such that users pay the full cost of water and
related services remains a significant challenge for policymakers, especially
when it comes to agricultural water users. This is particularly apparent in the
recovery of costs related to capital, which are frequently absorbed by
governments rather than passed on to irrigators. The political will to deal
with this issue is mixed and all-too-often governments resort to subsidising
capital expenditures in irrigation, even when there has been an agreed
trajectory towards full-cost recovery, as has occurred in Australia.
We have argued that one way to better deal with the political costs of price
reform in irrigation is to consider the preference of irrigation farmers and
identify those elements of reform that are less likely to attract criticism. In
addition, we have argued that relatively little empirical evidence is available
on this front, making this current study novel. This makes the data assembled
for this study relatively unique and provides guidance for further research in
this context.
Whilst acknowledging some weaknesses in the data, our results suggest that
there is a basis for engaging in a discussion about tariff reform in irrigation
that at least partially aligns with the notion of cost recovery. For example,
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irrigators had significant preferences for water prices that were clearer, were
aligned with their business demands and tariffs that did not limit adaptation
or adjustment out of irrigation, should the alternative be more profitable.
Clearly, these preferences are not at odds with the notion of full-cost recovery
and have the potential to be leveraged to achieve change. In addition, the
results highlight some of the gaps in the rationale used by governments to
offer subsidies for irrigation infrastructure.
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